
Case 4:10-cv-00946-A

Document 1 Filed 12/14/10 Page 1 of 10 Page [

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Jerry J. Jarzombek 714 W. Magnolia Avenue Fort Worth, Texas 76104 817-348-8325 817-348-8328 Facsimile



# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

CLYDE E. RANDLE,	 §	Civil Action No.				
Plaintiff,	§ §	4-10 CV-946 A				
	§	COMPLAINT				
VS.	§	and				
	§	DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL				
	§					
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC and	§					
McCLESKY, HARRIGER, BRAZILL &	§					
GRAF, LLP,	§					
Defendants.	§					
	§					
	§	(Unlawful Debt Collection Practices)				

## **Preliminary Statement**

1. Plaintiff, Clyde E. Randle ("Randle"), brings this action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"), as well as under the Texas Debt Collection Act, Tex. Finance Code § 392.001, et seq. ("TDCA") and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Subchapter E, Chapter 17, Business & Commerce Code ("DTPA"), to obtain statutory damages, actual damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and other relief for the Defendants' violations of the FDCPA, the TDCA and the DTPA.

- 2. Defendant, Midland Funding, LLC ("Midland") attempted to collect a consumer debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff, arising from a purported obligation to Providian. The obligation ("Debt") required Plaintiff to pay money arising out of transactions in which money, property, insurance, or services were the subject thereof and the same were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Specifically, the alleged debt arose from a credit card, which was used by the Plaintiff for non-business purposes. Midland claims to have acquired the Debt, after default, from Providian.
- 3. Defendant, McCkelsy, Harriger, Brazill & Graf, LLP ("McClesky") attempted to collect a consumer debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff, arising from a purported obligation to Providian, now allegedly owed by Midland. The obligation ("Debt") required Plaintiff to pay money arising out of transactions in which money, property, insurance, or services were the subject thereof and the same were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Specifically, the alleged debt arose from a credit card, which was used by the Plaintiff for non-business purposes. Midland claims to have acquired the Debt, after default, from Providian.

### Jurisdiction and Venue

- 4. Jurisdiction of this Court attains pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a), and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction for the TDCA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
- 5. Venue in the Northern District of Texas is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c) and because the acts and transactions occurred here and the Defendant transacts business here.

### **Parties**

- 6. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Texas. Plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) and Tex. Finance Code § 392.001(1).
- 7. Midland is an entity engaged in the business of collecting consumer debts in the Northern District of Texas. The principal purpose of Midland's business is the collection of consumer debts which it has acquired, after default. Midland does not extend credit to any of the consumers whose debt it acquires. Rather, the sole purpose of the acquisition of these defaulted debts is their collection, for profit. Midland is a "debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) and Tex. Finance Code § 392.001(6). Midland is also a "third-party debt collector" as defined by Tex. Finance Code § 392.001(7).
- 8. McClesky is an individual engaged in the business of collecting consumer debts in the Northern District of Texas. The principal purpose of McClesky's business is the collection of consumer debts using the mails and telephone, and it regularly attempts to collect consumer debts for others. McClesky is a "debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) and Tex. Finance Code § 392.001(6). McClesky is also a "third-party debt collector" as defined by Tex. Finance Code § 392.001(7).

## **Factual Allegations**

9. On or about July 16, 2010, McClesky filed suit on behalf of Midland in the Justice Court, Precinct 8 of Tarrant County, Texas, under Cause No. C15292. Said suit was styled *Midland Funding, LLC v. Clyde E. Randle* (the "State Court Case.").

- 10. Cause No. C15292 sought recovery under various theories, including breach of contract.
- 11. All theories of recovery pleaded in the state court lawsuit were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, as more than four years has passed since the date of default. When Randle answered the State Court Case, he noted in his answer that Plaintiff's claims were barred by limitations. Undaunted by this notice, Defendants have maintained the lawsuit, propounding discovery on Randle, which has been answered.
- 12. Defendants were aware of the passage of limitations, as McClesky stated to Randle in a telephone conversation on or about August 4, 2010 that the Debt was charged off by the original creditor for non-payment in December of 2005.
- 13. Also on August 4, 2010, McClesky represented that a balance remained on this Debt, and told Randle "you still have to pay it it doesn't go away."
- 14. As to the longevity of the account, McClesky represented to Randle that the account was "opened in 1995 ... charged off in December 2005 for non-payment." As to the relationship between when payments stop and charge-off, McClesky represented that "typically it goes three months before they charge it off."
- 15. McClesky represented to Randle that he made a payment of \$60 in October 2006, which Randle denies. However, a partial payment after charge-off does not interrupt the running of limitations. Mere payment of a debt neither interrupts running of statute of limitations on debt nor acknowledges justness of debt with implicit promise to pay it. *Siegel v. McGavock Drilling Co.* 530 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Civ.App 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

- 16. Defendants mistake of law is not a shield for liability under the FDCPA. See *Jerman* v. Carlisle, et al, 129 S.Ct. 2863 (2009).
- 17. Randle has incurred legal fees in the defense of the time-barred claim asserted by Defendants.
- 18. The foregoing acts and omissions were undertaken on behalf of the Defendants by their respective officers, agents, or employees acting at all times relevant hereto within the scope of that relationship.
- 19. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants were undertaken by them willfully, intentionally, knowingly, and/or in gross disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff. Defendants knew or should have known that the Debt was barred by limitations as they had the date of the charge-off in their records which was December 2005 and knew that default occurred at least three months prior to that time, and elected to file the time-barred suit on July 10, 2010, long after limitations had expired.
- 20. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants were undertaken indiscriminately and persistently, as part of Defendants' regular and routine collection efforts, and without regard to or consideration of the rights of the Plaintiff.

### First Claim for Relief

21. The Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs. The Defendants' violations of the FDCPA include, but are not limited to the a. following:

- a. In violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, the Defendants engaged in conduct the natural consequence of which was to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with the collection of a debt, which conduct included filing suit on a time-barred debt, and causing Plaintiff to incur attorney's fees in the defense thereof.
- In violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2)(a), 15 U.S.C. § b. 1692e(10), and the "least sophisticated consumer standard," the Defendants used objectively false representations and/or false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of a consumer debt. Sections 15 U.S.C. 1692e, e(2)(A) and e(5) of the FDCPA have been interpreted to prohibit a debt collector from threatening to sue or instituting suit on a debt that it knows is barred by the statute of limitations. See Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. 1480, 1488-1490 (M.D.Ala. 1987); Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 383, at 393 (D. Del. 1991) (noting that it is an FDCPA violation for a debt collector to threaten a lawsuit if he or she knows or should know that such a suit is time barred); Stepney v. Outsourcing Solutions, Inc., 1997 U.S.Dist. Lexis 18264, 1997 WL 722972 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss because Plaintiff alleged a violation of the FDCPA based on Defendant's knowing attempt to collect time barred debt with threats of "further collection action"); Goins v. JBC & Associates, Jack H. Boyajian, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 595.
- c. In violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) and the "least sophisticated consumer standard," the Defendants threatened to take an action (and took such an action) which cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.
- d. In violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, the Defendants used unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt, which conduct included filing suit on a time-barred debt, and causing Plaintiff to incur attorney's fees in the defense thereof.
- 22. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, Defendants' violations of the FDCPA render them jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for statutory damages, actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees.

### **Second Claim for Relief**

- 23. The Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs. The Defendants' violations of the TDCA include, but are not limited to the following:
  - a. In violation of Tex. Fin. Code § 392.301(a)(8), the Defendants threatened to take (and/or did take) an action prohibited by law.
  - b. In violation of Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(8), the Defendants misrepresented the character of a consumer debt, and the status of the debt in a judicial proceeding.
  - c. In violation of Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(19), Defendants used false representations and deceptive means to collect a consumer debt.
- 24. Under Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403, the Defendants' violations of the TDCA render them jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for statutory damages, actual damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees.

### **Third Claim for Relief**

- 25. The Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs. The Defendants' violations of the DTPA include, but are not limited to the following:
  - a. Pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.404, the Defendants' violations of the TDCA also constitute a deceptive trade practice under Subchapter E, Chapter 17, Business & Commerce Code, ("DTPA") and is actionable under that subchapter.
- 26. Under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(b)(2), the Defendants' violations of the DTPA render them jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for injunctive relief and reasonable attorney's fees.

## **Prayer for Relief**

# WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that this Court:

- 1. Declare that Defendant's actions violate the FDCPA, the TDCA and the DTPA.
- 2. Enjoin the Defendants' actions which violate the TDCA and the DTPA.
- 3. Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants for statutory damages, actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees as provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) and/or Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403 and/or Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.50(d).
- 4. Grant such further relief as deemed just.

Respectfully submitted,

Jerry J. Jarzombek

Texas Bar No. 10589050

THE LAW OFFICE OF JERRY JARZOMBEK, PLLC

714 W. Magnolia Avenue Fort Worth, Texas 76104

817-348-8325

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### **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff demands trial by jury in this action.

Respectfully submitted,

Jerry J. Jarzombek

Texas Bar No. 10589050

THE LAW OFFICE OF JERRY JARZOMBEK, PLLC 714 W. Magnolia Avenue Fort Worth, Texas 76104 817-348-8325

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The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS lyde E. Randle				DEFENDANTS Midland Funding, LLC and McClesky, Harriger, Brazill & Graf, LLP			
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Tarrant (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)			<del></del>	County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)  NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED.			
(c) Attorney's (Firm Nam erry J. Jarzombek; The L 14 W. Magnolia Avenue;	e, Address, and Telephone Num aw Office of Jerry Jarz Fort Worth, TX 76104;	ombek, PLLC; 817-348-8325		Attorneys (If Known)	10 (	CV - 9	4.6. A
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1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	3 Federal Question (U.S. Government	Not a Party)			TF DEF	Incorporated or Pr	
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